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CHAPTER3

On the Meaning and Impact of the
Physician-Assisted Suicide Cases
Yale Kamisar

I read every newspaper article I could find on the meaning and impact of the U.S. Supreme Court's June 1997 decisions in Washington v Glucksberg 1 and Vacca v QuilP I came away with the impression
that some proponents of physician-assisted suicide (PAS) were unable or
unwilling publicly to recognize the magnitude of the setback they suffered
when the Court handed down its rulings in the PAS cases.
On Being Given "The Green Light"

The press reported that Barbara Coombs Lee, Executive Director of Compassion in Dying (an organization that counsels people considering PAS and
one of the plaintiffs in the Glucksberg case), was "really thrilled" that the
Supreme Court had given her organization and her allies "a green light" to
seek legislation authorizing PAS. 3 But proponents of PAS have always had
"the green light" to persuade state legislatures to legalize PAS. The issue
presented by Glucksberg and Quill was whether the U.S. Constitution required or compelled the states to legalize PAS under certain circumstances,
not whether the states were permitted to do so.
Early in the oral arguments before the Supreme Court, Justice Stevens
asked the attorney representing Washington State whether it was his view
that a legislature had "the constitutional authority to authorize assisted suicide" and the answer was an unequivocal "yes." 4 A short time later, Justice
Ginsburg asked the attorney representing New York whether he agreed that
a legislature was free to legalize PAS and he, too, left no doubt that he believed a legislature was so entitled. 5
Nor did lawyers representing the plaintiffs in the PAS cases deny that
they had always had the green light to seek legislation authorizing PAS. But
they made it clear that they were not thrilled about pursuing such a course.
Thus, when asked by Justice Breyer why a legislature was not "far more
suited" to deal with end-of-life problems than a court interpreting a constitutional provision, Professor Laurence Tribe, the attorney for the respondents in Quill, responded that although "in a sense there are 50 laboratories
out there," they "are now operating largely with the lights out." 6 And when
This essay originally appeared in 82 Minnesota Law Review 895 (April1998).
Reprinted by permission.
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asked a similar question by Justice O'Connor, Kathryn Tucker, the attorney
for the respondents in Glucksberg, replied that because "ours is a culture of
denial of death," she had "some concerns that the political process would
not be expected to work in a usual fashion. "7
That the lawyers for the states, not the lawyers for the respondents,
urged the Court to let the state legislatures resolve the difficult issues involved in the PAS cases is hardly surprising. Proponents of PAS have not
fared well in the political arena. They did achieve success in 1994 when Oregon voters passed a "death with dignity" act (a vote Oregon reaffirmed three
years later), but so far Oregon has been a striking exception.
Washington and California ballot initiatives for "aid-in-dying" both
failed in the early 1990s. Moreover, in the last decade bills to legalize PAS
have been introduced in more than twenty states and none has passed. 8 Indeed, in 1997 alone seven state legislative attempts to legalize PAS "died outright or ... languished in committee." 9 On the other hand, bills expressly
prohibiting assisted suicide have fared much better. Since 1989, sixteen
such bills have been enacted into law. 10
Some have made much of the fact that five months after the Supreme
Court handed down its decisions in the PAS cases, Oregon voters reaffirmed
their support for assisted suicide by a much larger margin than the initial1994
vote. The state legislature had put the initiative (which had initially passed by a
51--49% vote) back on the ballot for an unprecedented second vote. This time
the initiative was reaffirmed overwhelmingly, 60--40%. Barbara Coombs Lee
hailed the event as "a turning point for the death with dignity movement." 11
David Garrow called the landslide vote "a good indicator of where America may
be headed." 12 Still another commentator viewed the lopsided vote as a demonstration of "[h]ow far, and how fast, public opinion is moving on this issue." 13
I think not. I think the most plausible explanation for the large margin
by which Oregon voters rebuffed efforts to repeal the initiative in favor of
PAS was their resentment and anger over the fact that the state legislature
had forced them to vote on the issue again-the first time in state history
that the legislature had tried to repeal a voter-passed initiative. Those running pro-PAS advertisements, we are told by the press, "play[ed] on the perceived anger" generated by the repeal effort itself. 14 It is worth noting that a
year after the second vote for assisted suicide in Oregon, a proposal to legalize physician assisted suicide in Michigan was defeated by almost a 3-1 vote. 15

What, If Anything, Has Changed?

Some consider the long-awaited Supreme Court opinions in the PAS cases
anticlimactic. 16 Dr. Robert Brody, a well-known medical ethicist at San
Francisco General Hospital and a co-author of recently published guidelines
permitting PAS under certain narrow circumstances, has gone so far as to
say that the Court's rulings "didn't change a thing." 17 I strongly disagree.
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To put the Supreme Court's rulings in the PAS cases in some perspective, let us go back a couple of years. The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Ninth
and Second Circuits may have gladdened the hearts of PAS proponents when
they ruled in the spring of 1996 that there was a constitutional right to assisted suicide under certain circumstances, 18 but these decisions stunned
many others. Until the two federal courts of appeals had handed down their
rulings, within the span of a single month, no American appellate court had
ever held that there was a right to assisted suicide under any circumstances.
The decisions by the two courts generated a good deal of momentum in
favor of physician-assisted suicide. The fact that the rulings came so close together, that there was no dissent in the Second Circuit case and that the decision of the Ninth Circuit was supported by a lopsided majority (8-3) all
contributed to this momentum. So did the directness and forcefulness of the
two majority opinions.
For example, the Ninth Circuit disparaged, almost ridiculed, two distinctions long relied on by opponents of PAS: (1) the distinction between
"letting die" and actively intervening to promote or to bring about death;
(2) the distinction between giving a patient a drug for the purpose of killing
her and administering drugs for the purpose of relieving pain, albeit with the
knowledge that such palliative care may hasten the patient's death. Observed the Ninth Circuit:
[W]e do not believe that the state's interest in preventing [PAS] is significantly greater than its interest in preventing the other forms of lifeending medical conduct that doctors now engage in regularly. More
specifically, we see little, if any, difference for constitutional or ethical
purposes between providing medication with a double effect and providing medication with a single effect, as long as one of the known effects in each case is to hasten the end of the patient's life. Similarly,
we see no ethical or constitutionally cognizable difference between a
doctors pulling the plug on a respirator and his prescribing drugs
which will permit a terminally ill patient to end his own life. In fact,
some might argue that pulling the plug is a more culpable and aggressive act on the doctor's part and provides more reason for criminal
prosecution. To us, what matters most is that the death of the patient
is the intended result as surely in one case as in the other .19
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit seemed unwilling to respect still another
oft-made distinction, the one between assisted suicide (where the patient
herself performs the last death-causing act) and active voluntary euthanasia
(where a person other than the patient commits the death-causing act). Although the court noted that there was no need to decide whether there was
a constitutional right to, or liberty interest in, active voluntary euthanasia, as
well as in PAS, the Ninth Circuit could not resist indicating how it would answer that question if and when the occasion arose: "[F]or present purposes
we view the critical line in right-to-die cases as the one between the volun-
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tary and involuntary termination of an individual's life .... We consider it
less important who administers the medication than who determines
whether the terminally ill person's life shall end." 20
In striking down, on equal protection grounds, New York's criminal prohibition against assisted suicide insofar as it prevented physicians from helping terminally ill, mentally competent patients commit suicide, the Second
Circuit, if anything, was more outspoken than the Ninth:
[T]here is nothing "natural" about causing death by [withdrawing life
support]. The withdrawal of nutrition brings on death by starvation,
the withdrawal of hydration brings on death by dehydration, and the
withdrawal of ventilation brings about respiratory failure. [Withdrawal
of life support] is nothing more nor less than assisted suicide ....
A finding of unequal treatment does not, of course, end the inquiry, unless it is determined that the inequality is not rationally related to some legitimate state interest. ... [But] what interest can the
state possibly have in requiring the prolongation of a life that is all but
ended? ... [And] what business is it of the state to require the continuation of agony when the result is imminent and inevitable? What concern prompts the state to interfere with a mentally competent patient's "right to define [his] own concept of existence, or meaning, of
the universe, and of the mystery of human life," when the patient
seeks to have drugs prescribed to end life during the final stages of a
terminal illness? The greatly reduced interest of the state in preserving
life compels the answers to these questions: "None. "21
As I hope I have made clear, both the Ninth and Second Circuits employed very strong and very quotable language-language that could be used
quite effectively to advance the cause of PAS in editorials, op-ed pieces, talk
shows, state legislatures and state courts. But then the U.S. Supreme Court
entered the fray. It disagreed with the lower federal courts virtually point by
point and, in effect, eradicated all the lower courts' forceful, felicitous, and
stirring language (from the viewpoint of a PAS proponent at any rate).
Nor is that all. Now that the Supreme Court has rejected their main
constitutional arguments, at least for the near future, I believe that proponents of PAS are in a weaker position than they were before these lawsuits
ever commenced. For the constitutional arguments they made without success in the Supreme Court and the policy arguments they have been making, and will continue to make, in the state legislatures or state courts or on
the op-ed pages of hundreds of newspapers greatly overlap.
I realize that, although the highest court in the land did not recognize
(or is not yet ready to recognize) a constitutional right to PAS, even under
narrow circumstances, one may still argue that there is a common law or
state constitutional right or a "moral" or "political" right to PAS. Nevertheless, it will be a good deal harder to engage in any kind of "rights talk" after
the Supreme Court decisions than before. There are only so many argu-
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ments in favor of a "right" to PAS-and almost all of them were addressed by
the Supreme Court in the Glucksberg and Quill cases. The Court, I think it
fair to say, did not find any of them convincing. Thus those arguments have
lost a considerable amount of credibility and will be easier to rebuff when
made again, albeit in a different setting. 22

Addressing and Rejecting Four Principal Arguments
in Favor of a Right to PAS
At this point it may be useful to summarize briefly (1) the main arguments
the Glucksberg and Quill plaintiffs made in assailing a total prohibition
against PAS and (2) the reasons Chief Justice Rehnquist gave for rejecting
each of these arguments (using the Chief Justice's own language wherever
possible):

Argument Withdrawal of life support is nothing more nor less than assisted suicide; there is no significant moral or legal distinction between the
two practices. The right to forgo unwanted life-sustaining medical treatment
and the right to enlist a physician's assistance in dying by suicide are merely
subcategories of the same broad right or liberty interest-controlling the time
and manner of one's death or hastening one's death.
Response The distinction between assisting suicide and terminating
lifesaving treatment is "widely recognized and endorsed in the medical profession and in our legal traditions [and] is both important and logical. "23 The
decision to commit suicide with a physician's assistance "may be just as personal and profound as the decision to refuse unwanted medical treatment,
but it has never enjoyed similar legal protection. Indeed, the two acts are
widely and reasonably regarded as quite distinct. "24
Argument There is no significant difference between administering
palliative drugs with the knowledge that it is likely to hasten the patient's
death and prescribing a lethal dose of drugs for the very purpose of killing
the patient. As the Ninth Circuit put it, there is no real distinction between
providing medication with a double effect and providing it with a single effect "as long as one of the known effects in each case is to hasten the end of
the patient's life. "25
Response In some cases, to be sure, "painkilling drugs may hasten a
patient's death, but the physician's purpose and intent is, or may be, only to
ease his patient's pain .... The law has long used actors' intent or purpose to
distinguish between two acts that may have the same result. ... [T]he law
distinguishes actions taken 'because of a given end [dispensing drugs in
order to bring about death] from actions taken 'in spite of their unintended
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but foreseen consequences [providing aggressive palliative care that may
hasten death, or increase its risk.]" 26

Argument The 1990 Cruzan case is not simply a case about the right
to forgo unwanted medical treatment. Considering the facts, it is really a
case about personal autonomy and the right to control the time and manner
of one's death. Cruzan's extension of the right to refuse medical treatment
to include the right to forgo life-sustaining nutrition and hydration was "influenced by the profound indignity that would be wrought upon an unconscious patient by the slow atrophy and disintegration of her body [and] can
only be understood as a recognition of the liberty, at least in some circumstances, to physician assistance in ending one's life." 27
Response Cruzan is not a suicide or an assisted suicide case. The
Court's assumption in that case was not based, as the Second Circuit supposed, "on the proposition that patients have a general and abstract 'right to
hasten death,' but on well established, traditional rights to bodily integrity
and freedom from unwanted touching." 28 Indeed, "[i]n Cruzan itself, we recognized that most States outlawed assisted suicide-and even more do
today-and we certainly gave no intimation that the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment could be somehow transmuted into a right to assistance in committing suicide." 29
Argument Fourteenth Amendment Due Process protects one's right to
make intimate and personal choices, such as those relating to marriage, procreation, child rearing-and the time and manner of one's death. As the Ninth
Circuit observed, quoting language from Planned Parenthood v Casey: "Like
the decision of whether or not to have an abortion, the decision how and when
to die is one of 'the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in
a lifetime,' a choice 'central to personal dignity and autonomy."' 30
Response The capacious, one might even say majestic, language in
Casey-observing that "the right to define one's own concept of existence ... and of the mystery of human life" is "at the heart of liberty" 31 and
noting that some important precedents in this area dealt with matters "involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy" 32-simply "described, in a general way and in light of our prior cases, those personal
activities and decisions that this Court has identified as so deeply rooted in
our history and traditions, or so fundamental to our concept of constitutionally ordered liberty, that they are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. "33 However, the fact that many of the rights and liberties protected by
due process "sound in personal autonomy does not warrant the sweeping
conclusion that any and all important, intimate, and personal decisions are
so protected, and Casey did not suggest otherwise." 34

62 · Law at the End of Life
Justice O'Connor's Concurring Opinion

I am well aware that in both Glucksberg and Quill Justice O'Connor provided the fifth vote (along with Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas) to
make the Chief Justice's opinions the opinions of the Court-by stating that
she joined Rehnquist's opinion, yet writing separately. I am aware, too, that
in large measure two other members of the Court, Justices Ginsburg and
Breyer, joined O'Connor's opinion.
However, there is no indication in Justice O'Connor's brief concurring
opinion that she found any of the principal arguments made by PAS proponents any more persuasive than the Chief Justice did. There is no suggestion, for example, that she reads the Cruzan opinion any more broadly than
does the Chief Justice or that she interprets the stirring language in Casey
any more expansively. Nor is there any suggestion that she has any more difficulty accepting the distinction between forgoing life-sustaining medical
treatment and actively intervening to bring about death. Nor is there any
reason to think that she has more trouble grasping the "double effect" principle (the principle that explains why a doctor forbidden to administer a
lethal dose of drugs for the very purpose of killing a patient may increase the
dosage of medication needed to relieve pain even though the increased
dosage is likely to hasten death or increase its risk).
Indeed, in one respect at least Justice O'Connor may have gone a step
further than the Chief Justice. I think she may be saying-she is certainly
implying-that the "double effect" principle is not only plausible but necessary. Her position (and Justice Breyer's as well) seems to be that if, for example, a state were to prohibit the pain relief that a patient desperately
needs when the increased dosage of medication is so likely to hasten death
or cause unconsciousness that, according to the state, the procedure smacks
of assisted suicide or euthanasia, 35 she (presumably along with Justices
Breyer and Ginsburg) would want to revisit the question.
Professor Cass Sunstein reads Justice O'Connor's opinion differently
than I do. He believes that O'Connor "signaled the possible existence of a
right to physician-assisted suicide in compelling circumstances." 36 I think
that is too broad a reading.
Early in her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor does say that there is
no need to address "the narrower question whether a mentally competent
person who is experiencing great suffering has a constitutionally cognizable
interest in controlling the circumstances of his or her imminent death." 37
That comment would provide some support for Professor Sunstein's viewif it were all Justice O'Connor had to say on the subject. But it is not. As her
opinion continues, the general question about a constitutionally protected
interest in controlling the circumstances of one's death is put aside and the
opinion turns into a more narrow and more focused discussion about the liberty interest in obtaining needed pain relief or in preventing a state from
erecting legal barriers preventing access to such relief.
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This is why, I believe, Justice O'Connor deems it important that the parties and amici agree that the states of Washington and New York have imposed no legal barriers to pain relief. 38 "In this light," she continues, "even
assuming" that there is a constitutionally protected interest in controlling
the circumstances of one's death, "the State's interests ... are sufficiently
weighty to justify a prohibition against physician-assisted suicide."39 Moreover, at the end of her opinion, Justice O'Connor describes the "constitutionally cognizable interest" rather narrowly:
In sum, there is no need to address the question whether suffering patients have a constitutionally cognizable interest in obtaining relief
from the suffering that they may experience in the last days of their
lives. There is no dispute that dying patients in Washington and New
York can obtain palliative care, even when doing so would hasten their
deaths. 40
In isolation, "obtaining relief from suffering" could mean assisted suicide or euthanasia. In context, however, I think it means only a liberty interest in obtaining pain relief. In light of her entire opinion, I believe Justice
O'Connor's description of the constitutionally cognizable interest at the end
of her opinion is more accurate than the one she refers to at the outset. Justice O'Connor's overall view appears to be that so long as a state erects no
legal barriers to obtaining pain relief (even when the analgesics may hasten
death or cause unconsciousness), the state's interests in protecting those
who are not truly competent or whose wish to commit suicide is not truly
voluntary (and the difficulties involved in defining "terminal illness" and ascertaining who fits that category) are sufficiently strong to uphold a total ban
against PAS. 41
As best as I can tell, Justice Breyer, who joined Justice O'Connor's opinion (except insofar as her opinion joined the majority) and also wrote separately, took essentially the same position as O'Connor. Even assuming that
there is something like a "right to die with dignity," Justice Breyer saw no
need to decide whether such a right is "fundamental. "42 Why not? Because,
as he saw it, "the avoidance of severe physical pain (connected with death)
would have to comprise an essential part of any successful claim" 43 and "as
Justice O'Connor points out, the laws before us do not force a dying patient
to undergo that kind of pain. "44
"Rather," continued Breyer, the laws of New York and Washington
allow physicians to provide patients with pain-relieving drugs "despite the
risk that those drugs themselves will kill." 45 So long as this is the case, concluded Breyer, laws prohibiting PAS "would overcome any remaining significant interests" making up a "dying with dignity" claim and thus withstand
constitutional challenge. 46
Justice Breyer emphasized that the crucial question is not whether a
patient is receiving adequate palliative care but whether state laws prevent
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a patient from obtaining such care: "We [are] ... told that there are many
instances in which patients do not receive the palliative care that, in principle, is available, but that is so for institutional reasons or inadequacies or obstacles, which would seem possible to overcome, and which do not include a
prohibitive set of laws. "47
I believe some passages in Solicitor General Dellinger's amicus brief
and some of his remarks during the oral arguments significantly illuminate
the views of both Justice O'Connor and Justice Breyer.
Although the Solicitor General denied that "there is a broad liberty interest in deciding the timing and manner of ones death, "48 he went on to say
that the term "liberty" in the Due Process Clause "is broad enough to encompass an interest on the part of terminally ill, mentally competent adults
in obtaining relief from the kind of suffering experienced by the plaintiffs in
this case. "49 Not only is a liberty interest implicated when a state inflicts severe pain or suffering on someone, continued the Solicitor General, but also
when a state "compels a person" to suffer severe pain caused by an illness by
"prohibiting access to medication that would alleviate the condition." 50
During the oral arguments General Dellinger maintained:
[A] person states a cognizable liberty interest when he or she alleges
that the state is imposing severe pain and suffering or has adopted a
rule which prevents someone from the only means of relieving that
pain and suffering ....
. . . [lfj one alleges the kind of severe pain and agony that is being
suffered here and that the state is the cause of standing between you
and the only method of relieving that, you have stated a constitutionally cognizable liberty interest. ... 51
Kathryn Tucker, the lead lawyer for the plaintiffs in the Glucksberg
case, addressed the Court immediately after General Dellinger. She was not
pleased with the Solicitor General's description of the liberty interest at
stake: "[T]he Solicitor General's comment that what were dealing with here
is simply a liberty interest in avoiding pain and suffering ... absolutely trivializes the claim. We have a constellation of interests [including decisional
autonomy and the interest in bodily integrity], each of great Constitutional
dimension. "52
It may well be that a liberty interest in obtaining pain relief or not being
denied access to such relief is only a "trivialized" version of the liberty interest really at stake. 53 But Justices O'Connor and Breyer (and presumably Justice Ginsburg as well, for she concurred in the judgments in both cases "substantially for the reasons stated by Justice O'Connor" 54 ) focused heavily,
perhaps exclusively, on that trivialized or down-sized version.
Since Justices Stevens and Souter, who also concurred in the judgments,
seem even more receptive than O'Connor, Ginsburg, and Breyer to arguments
in favor of a right to PAS, at least in compelling cases, 55 there is reason to think
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that at least five members of the Court are likely to resist state legislative efforts to reject or to modify the "double effect" principle if such action would
force some dying people to endure severe pain. 56 Thus, although "Rehnquist's
opinions did not endorse a constitutional right to adequate palliative care but
simply rejected the conclusion of the Ninth and Second Circuit Courts of Appeals,"57 it may well be that "[a] Court majority" (the five concurring justices
in Glucksberg and Quill) did effectively endorse such a right. 58
In a sense, the Court's support for the "double effect" principle is a victory for everybody. For whatever position they may take on assisted suicide
or euthanasia, surely most people want the dying and severely ill to suffer as
little physical pain as possible. And as Howard Brody has observed:
Clinicians need to believe to some degree in some form of the principle of double effect in order to provide optimal symptom relief at
the end of life .... A serious assault on the logic of the principle of
double effect could do major violence to the (already reluctant and
ill-informed) commitment of the mass of physicians to the goals of
palliative care and hospice. 59
In a way, however, the showing of support for the "double effect" principle by the highest court in the land was a special victory for opponents of
assisted suicide and euthanasia. For they have long defended the principle.
And they did so again in the Glucksberg and Quill cases.
For example, in an amicus brief supporting the states of New York and
Washington, the American Medical Association (AMA), the American Nurses
Association, the American Psychiatric Association, and some forty other medical and health care organizations emphasized that a physician's obligation to
relieve pain and suffering and to promote the dignity of dying patients '"includes providing palliative treatment even though it may foreseeably hasten
death."' 60 The AMA (and the many other medical organizations that joined it)
told the Supreme Court: "[The] recognition that physicians should provide
pain medication sufficient to ease their pain, even where that may serve to
hasten death, is vital to ensuring that no patient suffer from physical pain." 61
A good number of those favoring the legalization (or constitutionalization) of PAS have sharply criticized the "double effect" principle. They have
condemned the supposed hypocrisy in permitting the use of analgesics that
hasten death while banning euthanasia. They have further maintained that
killing to relieve suffering has already been sanctioned in the context of
"risky pain relief. "62
Moreover, it is worth recalling that it was the 8-3 majority of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that disparaged the "double effect"
principle63-as Dr. Brody puts it, dismissing the principle as "moral
hypocrisy. "64
A robust version of the "double effect" principle-the view that even
when the level of medication is likely to cause death, the "double effect"
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principle may be constitutionally required-helps opponents of PAS, not
proponents of the practice. For one of the main arguments against the legalization of PAS is that "properly trained health care professionals can effectively meet their patients' needs for compassionate end-of-life care without
acceding to requests for suicide." 65 The "double effect" principle eases the
task of health care professionals-and eases the plight of their patients-and
thus weakens the case for PAS.

Some Final Thoughts on Justice O'Connor's
Concurring Opinion

Up to now, I have taken the position that if Justice O'Connor left the door
open for future litigation in this area, she only left it open a small crack. But
I must say that I find the reason she gave for joining the Chief Justice's opinions quite baffling. At the outset of her concurring opinion she states that
she is joining the Rehnquist opinions because she "agree[s] that there is no
generalized right to 'commit suicide."' 66 But nobody claimed that there was
a "generalized right to commit suicide" or a general right to obtain a physician's assistance in doing so. Nobody. 67
In their Supreme Court brief, the lawyers for the plaintiffs in the Washington case formulated the question presented as "[w]hether the Fourteenth
Amendment's guarantee of liberty protects the decision of a mentally competent, terminally ill adult to bring about impending death in a certain, humane, and dignified manner." 68 Furthermore, Kathryn Tucker, the lead
lawyer for the plaintiffs in the Washington case, began her oral argument by
telling the Supreme Court that "this case presents the question whether
dying citizens in full possession of their mental faculties at the threshold of
death due to terminal illness have the liberty to choose to cross the threshold in a humane and dignified manner." 69 It is hard to see how anyone could
emphasize death, dying, and terminal illness any more than that.
Since one of the principal arguments made by opponents of PAS is that
once established for terminally ill patients assisted suicide would not remain
so limited for very long/0 it was not surprising that several Justices voiced
doubts about whether the claimed right or liberty interest would or could or
should be limited to those on the threshold of death. 71 But Ms. Tucker stood
her ground.
She told the Court that "we do draw the line at a patient who is confronting death" because, unlike other individuals who wish to die by suicide,
one on the threshold of death no longer has a choice between living and
dying, but "only the choice of how to die. "72 She also recognized that a state
may prevent a nonterminally ill person from choosing suicide because one
day that person might "rejoice in that," but the same could not be said for
the person who is terminally ill-for his or her life is about to end anyhow. 73
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Moreover, when asked to define the liberty interest Dr. Quill and other
plaintiffs in the New York case were claiming, Ms. Tucker's co-counsel, Professor Laurence Tribe, told the Court that it "is the liberty, when facing imminent and inevitable death, not to be forced by the government to endure ... pain and suffering"; "the freedom, at this threshold at the end of
life, not to be a creature of the state but to have some voice in the question
of how much pain one is really going through." 74 This caused Justice Scalia
to respond, "Why does the voice just [arise] when death is imminent?" 75
From the outset of the litigation, the lawyers for the plaintiffs in the
Washington and New York cases insisted that the right or liberty interest
they claimed was limited to the terminally ill because, among other reasons,
I think they knew there was no appreciable chance that the courts would establish a general right to assisted suicide. Or, to put it somewhat differently,
I think they knew that the only chance they had of prevailing in the courts
was to ask for a narrowly limited right to PAS, one confined to the terminally
ill. They were well aware that such a narrowly limited right would cause less
alarm and command more support than a general right to assisted suicide.
In short, if all that the Supreme Court decided last June is that there is
no general right to commit suicide, the Court decided virtually nothing-because everybody agreed that there was no such right.
Justice O'Connor observes that "[t]he Court frames the issue in this
case as whether the Due Process Clause ... protects a 'right to commit suicide which itself includes a right to assistance in doing so,' and concludes
that our [history and legal traditions] do not support the existence of such a
right." 76 But this description of what "The Court" (or Chief Justice Rehnquist) did is incomplete.
In describing the claim at issue in Glucksberg, the Ninth Circuit had
used such language as "a constitutionally recognized 'right to die,"' "a due
process liberty interest in controlling the time and manner of one's death,"
"a liberty interest in hastening one's own death," 77 "a strong liberty interest
in choosing a dignified and humane death," 78 and an issue "deeply
affect[ing] individuals' right to determine their own destiny." 79 Apparently
annoyed at what he apparently considered the Ninth Circuit's sloppy and
emotive language, and perhaps displeased that in all its various descriptions
of the claim at issue the Ninth Circuit had avoided the term "suicide" (a
term that carries strongly negative associations), the Chief Justice maintained that a more careful statement of the question presented than any utilized by the Ninth Circuit would be "whether the 'liberty' specially protected
by the Due Process Clause includes a right to commit suicide which itself includes a right to assistance in doing so." 80
I readily admit that this passage caused a certain amount of confusion.
But it should not be forgotten that the Chief Justice pointed out at least three
times that the Ninth Circuit had held that the challenged law "was unconstitutional 'as applied to terminally ill competent adults who wish to hasten their
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death with medication prescribed by their physicians."'81 And in the penultimate paragraph of his opinion, the Chief Justice concluded: "We therefore
hold that [the Washington law] does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment,
either on its face or 'as applied to competent, terminally ill adults who wish to
hasten their deaths by obtaining medication prescribed by their doctors. "' 82
The Washington statute was challenged by three terminally ill patients
and four physicians who periodically treat terminally ill patients and who
wished to help such patients die by suicide. Although the patients died during the pendency of the case, the physicians remained.
Justice O'Connor did not argue that the physician-plaintiffs "lacked
standing" to challenge the constitutionality of the ban against PAS insofar as
it applied to competent, terminally ill patients. In contrast, Justice Stevens,
who wrote a separate concurring opinion, came close to saying just that. Although the Ninth Circuit considered the Washington law as applied toterminally ill, competent adult patients who wished to hasten their deaths, observed Stevens, all the patient-plaintiffs had died by then and therefore the
court of appeals' holding "was not limited to a particular set of plaintiffs before it." 83 But Stevens's statement is incomplete.
To be sure, the physician-plaintiffs were not threatened with prosecution for assisting in the suicide of a particular patient. As the Ninth Circuit
pointed out, however, "they ran a severe risk of prosecution under the
Washington statute, which proscribes the very conduct in which they seek to
engage." 84 Moreover, although Justice Stevens did not discuss this aspect of
the case, both the district court and the court of appeals proceeded on the
basis that the physician-plaintiffs had standing to sue on behalf of their terminally ill patients as well as on their own behalf. 85 This is hardly surprising;
the U.S. Supreme Court has frequently permitted physicians to assert their
patients' rights in challenging abortion restrictions. 86 Moreover, it might be
said that the Washington statute is aimed more directly at physicians than at
their patients. It does not make committing suicide with the assistance of
another a felony. It makes aiding another to commit suicide a felony.
If physicians lacked standing to challenge laws prohibiting assisted suicide, how could appellate courts ever consider an "as applied to terminally ill
patients" challenge? All terminally ill patients necessarily will die prior to
completion of the litigation. In fact, in the Clucks berg case all but one of the
patient-plaintiffs had died by the time the district court issued its decision.
What is the most plausible explanation for Justice O'Connor's odd statement that she is joining the Chief Justice's opinions in Glucksberg and Quill
because she "agree[s] that there is no generalized right to 'commit suicide"'87 (an odd statement, certainly, in light of the history of the case and
against the background of the briefs and the oral arguments)? Although this
is a conclusion that I am not eager to reach, I think the reason for Justice
O'Connor's statement is a reluctance to rule out the possibility of a right to
PAS in every set. of circumstances and a desire to "proceed with special caution" in this area.88
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The Next Time Around

I have to agree with the many Court watchers who say (especially those who
were unhappy with the result in the assisted suicide cases) that Glucksberg
and Quill will not be the Court's last word on the subject. But it hardly follows that the next time the Court confronts the issue it will establish a right
to assisted suicide in some limited form. There were a number of factors at
work when the Supreme Court decided the 1997 PAS cases and most of
them will still be operating when the Court addresses the issue a second
time.
For one thing, the issue has recently been the subject of intense discussion and vigorous debate and there is no indication this agitation will subside
in the foreseeable future. As the Chief Justice observed (and concurring
Justice O'Connor agreed), "[p]ublic concern and democratic action are
... sharply focused on how best to protect dignity and independence at the
end of life, with the result that there have been many significant changes in
state laws and in the attitudes these laws reflect." 89
For another thing, the rights of a politically vulnerable group are not at
stake-as had been the situation when the Court intervened in prior cases. 90
Mter all, "[d]ying people are clearly not a discrete and insular minority in the
same, sure way as are black people subject to race discrimination laws [or]
women subject to abortion restrictions. "91 And when the issue is close and
"there is no democratic defect in the underlying political process," courts
"should not strike down reasonable legislative judgments. "92
I think Justice O'Connor put it well when, reiterating a point she made
during the oral arguments, 93 she commented:
Every one of us at some point may be affected by our own or a family
member's terminal illness. There is no reason to think the democratic
process will not strike the proper balance between the interests of terminally ill, mentally competent individuals who would seek to end
their suffering and the State's interests in protecting those who might
seek to end life mistakenly or under pressure. 94
Another reason, quite likely, for the Court's reluctance to establish a
constitutionally protected right to, or liberty interest in, assisted suicide, and
one that will apply the next time around as well, is capsuled in the Solicitor
General's amicus brief: once an exception to the general prohibition against
PAS is mandated by the Court, however heavily circumscribed it might be at
first, "there is no obvious stopping point. "95
For example, the Ninth Circuit invalidated the state's assisted suicide
ban "only 'as applied to competent, terminally ill adults who wish to hasten
their deaths by obtaining medication prescribed by their doctors."' 96 Mter
noting Washington State's insistence that the impact of the Ninth Circuit's
decision "will not and cannot be so limited," 97 the Chief Justice observed:
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The [Ninth Circuit's] decision, and its expansive reasoning, provide
ample support for the State's concerns. The court noted, for example,
that the "decision of a duly appointed surrogate decision maker is for
all legal purposes the decision of the patient himself," that "in some
instances, the patient may be unable to self-administer the drugs
and ... administration by the physician ... may be the only way the
patient may be able to receive them," and that not only physicians, but
also family members and loved ones, will inevitably participate in assisting suicide. Thus, it turns out that what is couched as a limited
right to "physician-assisted suicide" is likely, in effect, a much broader
license, which could prove extremely difficult to solve and contain. 98
Although concurring Justice Ginsburg neither joined the Chief Justice's
opinion nor wrote an opinion of her own, 99 during the oral arguments she
voiced skepticism that any right to PAS, no matter how narrowly limited initially, could or would be confined to the terminally ill or could or would stop
short of active voluntary euthanasia.
When Kathryn Tucker, lead attorney for the plaintiffs in Glucksberg,
urged the Court to recognize, or to establish, a constitutionally protected liberty interest "that involves bodily integrity, decisional autonomy, and the
right to be free of unwanted pain and suffering," 100 Justice Ginsburg retorted
that "a lot of people would fit [this] category," not just the terminally ill. 101
How, she wondered, do you "leave out the rest of the world who would fit the
same standards?" 102 At another point, Justice Ginsburg suggested that the
patient who is so helpless or in so much agony that she "is not able to assist
in her own suicide," but must have a health professional administer a lethal
injection, is "in a more sympathetic situation" than one who is able to commit suicide with the preliminary assistance of a physician. 103
Still another factor that must have had some impact on at least some
members of the Court and is bound to influence at least some of the Justices
in future cases, is the strong opposition of the AMA and other medical
groups to the constitutionalization or legalization of PAS, regardless of how
narrowly limited the constitutional right or the statutory authorization might
be. As Linda Greenhouse has pointed out, 104 the amicus brief filed by the
AMA in Glucksberg and Quill sharply contrasted with the one the same organization had filed seven years earlier in the Cruzan case. 105 In Cruzan, the
AMA told the Court that under the circumstances, terminating life support
was in keeping with "respecting the patient's autonomy and dignity." 106 In
Glucksberg and Quill, however, the AMA (and more than forty other national and state medical and health care organizations) told the Court that
"[t]he ethical prohibition against physician-assisted suicide is a cornerstone
of medical ethics"; the AMA had repeatedly "reexamined and reaffirmed"
that ethical prohibition, and had done so as recently as the summer of 1996;
and that "[p]hysician-assisted suicide remains 'fundamentally incompatible
with the physician's role as healer, would be difficult or impossible to control, and would pose serious societal risks."' 107

Meaning and Impact of Physician-Assisted Suicide Cases · 71
Recent and continuing trends in medical practice may only heighten
the AMA's resistance to PAS. The next time the issue is presented, the AMA
and other medical groups might well tell the Court, as two commentators
have recently argued, that new trends and developments make the need to
maintain the absolute prohibition against PAS "more important than
ever." 108 It would not be surprising if the next time around the AMA and
other medical groups were to tell the Court something like this:
Given the great pressures threatening medical ethics today-including, among other factors, a more impersonal practice of medicine, the
absence of a lifelong relationship with a physician, the push toward
managed care, and the financially-based limitation of services-a
bright line rule regarding medically-assisted death is a bulwark against
disaster. 109
Finally, another factor at work in the assisted suicide cases, and one
that will operate as well the next time the Court confronts the issue, is the
Justices' realization that if they were to establish a right to assisted suicide,
however limited, the need to enact legislation implementing and regulating
any such right would generate many problems-which inevitably would find
their way back to the Court.
Whether a regulatory mechanism would be seen as providing patients
and physicians with much-needed protection or viewed as unduly burdening
the underlying right would be largely in the eye of the beholder. 110 Thus it is
not surprising that proponents of PAS even disagree among themselves as to
how a particular procedural requirement should be regarded.
For example, three of the nation's most respected proponents of PAS,
Franklin Miller, Howard Brody, and Timothy Quill, have questioned the desirability of the fifteen-day waiting period required by the Oregon Death with
Dignity Act, a provision designed to ensure that a patient's decision to elect
assisted suicide is resolute. 111 According to Miller, Brody and Quill, such an
"arbitrary time period ... may be highly burdensome for patients who are
suffering intolerably and may preclude access to assisted death for those
who request it at the point when they are imminently dying. "112 The same
three commentators also criticize a provision of a Model State Act requiring
that the discussion between physician and patient concerning a request for
assisted suicide be witnessed by two adults, 113 calling it "unduly intrusive
and unlikely to be effective." 114 On the other hand, Miller, Brody, and Quill
maintain that an Oregon provision requiring a second medical opinion on
the assisted suicide decision is "not a reliable safeguard" because it "does not
mandate that the consulting physician be genuinely independent." 115
Perhaps the most rigorous condition on PAS to be found is the requirement of Compassion in Dying that the approval of all of the would-be suicide's immediate family members be obtained. 116 It is hard to believe that
any group favoring PAS would retain such a requirement if the Court were
to establish a constitutional right to assisted suicide. But one can be fairly
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sure that if the Court were to establish such a right, opponents of PAS would
fight hard to include a "family approval" provision in any legislation regulating assisted suicide-along with mandatory waiting periods, specified information and procedures to ensure that the decision to choose PAS is "truly
informed," and all sorts of notification requirements and bans on the use of
public facilities, public employees, and public funds. 117
Although not insubstantial, the differences among proponents of PAS
over the requisite conditions and procedures for carrying out the practice
pale compared to the differences likely to exist between those who disagree
about legalizing PAS in the first place. In short, in many respects the legislative response to a Supreme Court decision establishing a right to assisted
suicide is likely to be a replay of the response to Roe v Wade, 118 a specter that
did not escape the attention of the Justices last year.
At one point in the oral arguments, the Chief Justice told the lead
lawyer for the Glucksberg plaintiffs:
You're not asking that [this Court engage in legislation] now. But
surely that's what the next couple of generations are going to have to
deal with, what regulations are permissible and what not if we uphold
your position here .... [Y]ou're going to find the same thing ... that
perhaps has happened with the abortion cases. There are people who
are just totally opposed and people who are totally in favor of them. So
you're going to have those factions fighting it out in every session of
the legislature, how far can we go in regulating this. And that will be a
constitutional decision in every case. 119
Roe v Wade ignited what has aptly been called a "domestic war," 120 one
that, after a quarter-century of tumult, seems finally to have come to an end
in the courts. The Court that decided the assisted suicide cases in 1997 was
not eager to set off a new domestic war. Neither, I venture to say, will the
Court be the next time around.
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